ln this monograph Professor Tai-l·Ieng Cheng purports to set up a global perspective on the rolc of international law in international relations, and in particular on the conditions and ways through which it can be effective. The perspective is the one of the 'rational' dccision-maker, in the best vein of the New Haven school, whose theoretical framework the author espouscs completely and thoroughly. The book is a valuable contribution to international legal theory; it is not written in abstract and hollow words, but on the basis of a practical enquiry based on many examples. By adopting this perspective, it provides the re ader with many interesting insights. ln particular, it is enriching for the European reader, who is not used to this genu· inely 'US-American' perspective. The various chapters of the book arc as follows: 'Confronting Anxieties about International Law'; 'The Politics of'T'beorizing'; 'Legalism and Morality'; 'Judges'; 'Arbitrators'; 'Regula tors'; 'Legal Advisors'; 'Officiais'; and 'Law beyond Cases'. The purpose of these !ines is not to give a full account of that book. Nor is it to portray the numerous thought-provoking and fruitful aspects of the developmcnts contained therein; nor, by the way, is it to criticizc sorne points on which the 'Europeans' will easily disagree with the author, as on what is permitted to the US officiais in Guant<:lnamo (p. 227 ff.). The pointis rather to spell out sorne cardinal aspects, which seem to the present au tb orto be weaknesses of the general approach or inadequacies of particular points. The critical approach, which will here be put forward, should not lead the reader to believe that the book presently criticized is devoid of merit. On the contrary, the author of these !ines would not have ventured into the exercise of writing an essay on it if he ha cl bclieved that su ch was the case.
One of the basic tenets of the New Haven school is that law is not about rules, but about rational decision making in an open system. The decision-maker is not just interpreting and applying rulcs, seeking to find out to what extent these rules constrain his decision. He do es not f cel 'bound' in su ch a narrow fashion. In particular, international law would not be obeyed, if the decision-makcr bclieved that the application of a given 'rule' were compromising the intcrests of his state, unless, that is, there werc particular reasons to bow to the rule in a given exceptional situation (for example, for fcar of reprisais). Ali the attention of the research then shifts to how the decision maker takes decisions involving an application of international law, or alternativcly to how he ought to take decisions in that field. Hence, the law is constantly in flux. lt is embedded in a continuous and interactive pro cess of various decision-makers, based on certain societal values, by which the law emerges al ways in contcxt, and it is consequently necessarily limited to a particular set of quite unique facts. There is no hard and fast 'rule' to be followed, from which the law could be taken Jock, stock, and barrel, ready-made for consumption. This dynamic, process-oriented scheme, has appealed to many lawyers, also European (such as R. liiggins), who have found in it something at once refreshing and apparently realistic. The old-fashioned 'rule-oriented' approach could by contrast seem rooted in a sort of benevolent fiction of rule-a biding states, at once relaxing for the spirit as weil as aloof from realities. Clearly, in a decision-centred approach, not only legal certainty (which is in any case weak in international law, generally speaking), but also all the directive power of the law quite complctely disappears. The law as a living thing (in contrast to the law in books) is shaped by the decision-maker exclusively in the particular situation. The decision-maker takes the normative contents of somc provisions as simple rational criteria, which he has to weigh up in a complex process of ta king accoun t of ali the relevant circumstances and of ali the sc ope-or goal-values at stake in the particular case. This general balancing-up through a rational process of discourse, exchange, and choice leads him to a result by which he upholds a certain solution as the best possible of ali in the concrete circumstances. Thus, at the most basic Jcvcl, the decision maker takes a decision qui te largely as if the 'law' (taken as norms) did not exist: l sit clown and reflect about what is best to do, by putting ali the arguments in a matrix and weighing them up. If the legal norm did not exist, l would procced exactly in the same way as is described. Moreover, the 'criteria' which arc taken from the legal norms could exist also without the norm bearing them, si nee they encapsulatc rational aspects flowing from the existence of other subjects and their interests. These aspects of the problem would remain in any case; I would takc account of them in any constrained or unconstrained system of decision-making. Therefore, such a system posits at the end of the day that there is no truc 'normative guidance' as a normative constraint, since that would mean that the decision-makcr coule! be obliged to take a decision he considers inadequate in a certain subject matter or context ··-something he would not do. The consequence is that this 'rule approach' is not describing reality and must be abandon cd. A realistic approach, in contrast, holds that international law is in the decision itself, shaped in context: that corresponds to what actually happens. Ali in all, realism is the great concern in this thcory. Its priee is manifestly the loss of ali real legal constraint and DISCUSSION OF T. Il. CIIENG'S MONOGRAFH 753 legal previsibility through the ide a of rules that direct the be havi our of the subjects. 1t has flnally to be emphasized that the decision-maker envisaged by New Haven is essentially the one of the state. Or at least, the decision-makers that count are those acting for states. They have the interests of their state in mi nd when they take rational decisions.
Our point here is not the age-old criticism of decisionism, as opposed to legal norms and legal certainty. It goes deeper. Rules are made by a majority of states in order to bind the po licy of those same states taken individually in a certain way. In this superficial sense, they are 'democratie' constructs, a word taken here to connote the ide a that the legislator is the one who represents the majorit y will, in a way taking seriously the equality of states. From that assumption flow also the criteria for the binding character of these rules, namely consent (for agreements) and general practice and opinio juris (for customary international law). The roles of the single state or subject, and that of a specifie community of states acting as legislator (the parties to a treaty, the states of the international society in general custom, the states bound by a regional customary rule, etc.), are clearly separated and delineated. This is not the case in the New Haven approach. Here, each decision-maker taken uti singuli is the ultimate arbiter of the fate of international law, not only as a lawapplier (which is anyway a truc proposition, in view of the sovereignty of states) but also as a legislator. The doctrine of decision-making propounded by this school leads ultimately to the recognition of a quality oflegislator for each decision-maker. He is not just a subject applying the law and interpreting it, as in the 'rule' approach; quite on the contrary, he has become a partial legislator of international law, in competition with many other decision-makers acting as legislators. The New Haven approach thus first and foremost leads to a splitting-up of the concept of internationallcgislator, translated from a series of 'state communities', global or partial, to the single subject. It upholds and buttresses a concept of radical decentralization of international legislation. Contrary to the modern tendency to integra te the 'international community' by sorne common form oflegislation (called international law taken to be more than the sum of the external relations law of every single state) and of implementation, the position taken by Professor Cheng goes he re to the roots: the single decision-maker becomes the sovereign. Unilateralism consequently reaches a peak: we are not just confronted with decentralized interpretation and application of international law; it is rather a matter of single-unit legislation, performed by each state and decision-maker as su ch. By this token, majority rule is evacuated. The different drummer has free reign; and, in theory, each one could become a different drummer; anarchy is perfect. The focal point here is, then: who is the legislator? Who weighs up sorne interests and alternatives, and provides the society with some authoritative answers? The New Haven approach transfers that function from a collective body to a single subject. Majority rule is thus completely !ost. lt is not, however, a defined body-public imposing sorne legal rules on its subjects (as normally in the legal context); it is, to the contrary, the subject imposing on the others its own vision of wh at the law is or what it should be, by crea ting a rule in context. International law can be subjectively reinvented by each decision-maker, since it possesses legislative powers. The rule is not one of the majority, this must be stressed again -thus also the contempt of the classical New Haven school for the United Nations and its 'decision-making' or its values, dominated as they are by the Group of 77, qui te alien to the US way of thinking.
If that situation truly portrayed the 'reality', wc would have to accept it. The fiction of the 'community' as legislator in international aff airs, in the way previously defined, would have to be dropped as a masquerade yielding to scientific truth. However, a simple glanee at this reality shows that the New Haven approach does not reflect it faithfully, even if it contains an element of truth. It is already highly enlightening th at most of the states of the world and most legal au thors continue to follow a rule based approach; but, clearly, that is not decisive. The main pointis that the the ory of 'decision-making' in an open system, as that described by New Haven and in the present book, fits on! y to a great power. It describes essentially the reality of the great powers, the way they see things, the way they behave, and the way they shape decisions. For the great num ber of smaller states, the described decision making in an open system is not a possible option. They live in a tenser universe of relative constraints. And they cherish the rule approach, since they perceive in it a better guarantee of their interests and of their well-being than a decisionism which is bound to favour the stronger states. It is not by accident that Switzerland, the national sta Le of the au thor of the se lines, has consistently held that support for internationa !law as a set ofrules is one of the basic te nets of its foreign po licy, since the law (as rules) is the best protection of the weaker states. Apart from this political vision, it is evident that Lhe 'decision-maker' in such states does not feel an internationallegislator in the way New Haven posits. He may have sorne leeway for more robust decision-making he re and there, but he does not approach the matter generally in the way described by the New Haven approach. The basic rule of the au thor of the book, nam ely th at 'in ternationallaw will not be respected if it is not in the interest of the state', is th us true at best, with sorne caveats, for the great power but not for the smaller states. Thus, the New Haven approach may accurately describe a small section of the life of international law, namely the potent gravitation of the sovereign state in the proximity of great powers. Conversely, it does not describe the way matters are approached by the overwhelming majority of states in the world, which have to Lake account of 'legislation' external to them, and not just shaped by themselves in their own decision-making processes. In sum, it takes the (small) part for the whole; it is realistic, which it purports to be, only in a small sector of reality. This can be seen in a series of positions taken by New Haven and also in the present book: for example, the qui te permissive interpretation of the 'rules' on the use of force in international relations. This is important for a great power, but not at ali attractive for smaller States, whence the restrictive rules in the UN Charter and customary international law as i nterpreted by the ICJ. But a New Haven approach can easily subvert the se 'rules' as set by the majority. It can do so by a decision-making in context, fitting the parti cul ar interests of the great power performing it and being a legislator for itself. This self-judged 'international law' is then imposed on others by way of projection of the foreign policy. ln the eyes of the present commenta tor, if international law were ali but this, it would be better to abolish it as a discourse and as a reality, si nee it would just serve to cloak decisions under the mantle of an appcaling label, an exercise in power, hypocrisy, and bad faith. Howcver, the acid test is casy to administer: would the United States (and New Haven) accept bowing to the same decision-making freedom of ali the other 193 states of the world? Or would they accept that the same rules, as they interpret them, be applied against them, for example, the liberal use of force conceptions once turned against thcmsclves? The fa ct is rather that the US does not even accept having applied against it the narrowly interpreted ru les on the use of force. As we will sec in the discussion of the Nicaragua judgment of the ICJ, Professor Cheng indeed spares nothing in this decision of the Court, which he criticizes in an almost obsessive way. This is another way of secing the difference of freedom in decision-making, bctween the Grea ter and the Sm aller. ln the view of the present author, there are a series of other more specifie and tcchnical shortcomings in the book. Only some examples will be given here. Some chapters are cxccssively long and superficial. In the one on the 'Poli tics ofTheorizing', the main point to be made is that behind theoretical conceptions lie political beliefs. This is a qui te tri te utterance, well known, and absolutely à la mode; which obviously do es not mean that it is untrue. However, togo to lengths (pp. 24-7 2) to buttress just this point seems somewhat disproportional. The chapter suffers, moreover, from a haphazard and superficial juxtaposition of schools of thought and au thors (one has the impression that these are just taken because the author stumblcd upon them herc or there). The qualification of the authors as 'positivist' or otherwise is oftcn imprecise (to treat H. Lauterpacht as a positivist is more than dubious), and reveals on! y something about the position of the au thor himself: every rule-based lawyer is a formalist and a positivist. This is hardi y a proper understanding of the European legal schools. It is also more than a pity (indeed a professional fault) that the au thor, because of obvious language barriers, has taken account only of English legal (and mainly US) writing. This peculiar uni verse of references just reinforces the parochialism and closeness of the argument. It ex plains spectral mistakes, as the one described above about the labels to be put on severa! European authors. No single French, German, or Italian written text (not to spcak of those in other languages) is taken into account. For the present writer, it is more than doubtful if it is possible to write on 'international' law on the basis of so narrow a background. Here again, the part will ali too easily be misleadingly taken for the whole. The present author is not English-speaking, yet he has learned this language: why couJd a small effort towards other languages (and hence also towards other ways of thought) not be asked of US colleagues? There is further a point of regret in thal some technical errors have rcmained undiscovered. Thus, for example, the author more than once speaks of'Optional Protocol' litigation at the ICJ, meaning the option al-clause system (e.g. pp. 124, rsr). However, we are not here dealing with, for example, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and its Protocol giving competence to the Court und er Article 3 6, paragraph r, of the Statu te. Wc arc rather dealing with the unilateral optional declarations under Article 36, paragrapb 2, of the Statulc. ln the first case, one is confronted with compromissory clauses of conventional nature, and in the second with unilateral legal acts deposited with the Secretary-Ceneral of the UN. The legal basis is different in both situations and the law rclating to them is not the same. Another example again concerns the ICJ: it is written that 'when the ICJ is called to rendcr an advisory opinion, there is no explicit dispute resolution function. Indeed, the Statu tc of the ICJ states that an advisory opinion is not binding upon the parties' (p. 123). Not only is there nowhere such a provision in the Statute, but moreover there arc le gall y speaking no 'parties' in an advisory procedure. Su ch legal imprecision is unfortunate and perfectly avoidable.
Time has come to direct ourselves to the Nicaragua judgments of the ICJ (the one on Competence and Admissibility of 1984 and the one on the Merits of 1986).
1
Professor Cheng clisagrees with almost every point in the Court's approach and handling of that dispute, accusing the judges of having broken a chain of case law which is objective and balanced, to espouse a selective, biased, and political judgment in this dispute opposing Nicaragua and the United States. The present author disagrees in turn with almost ali of the arguments advanced by Professor Cheng, and thus wishes to rebut them one by one. The Nicaragua judgments are certainly not perfect; they have the ir weaknesses and shortcomings, as every hu man endeavour and undertaking; but they are not marred, in the eyes of the present author, by the defaults levied against them in the present book. The vividness of the criticism, di ffering from the more placid account on other subject matters of the book, is a witness of the subjective feelings ofProfessor Cheng, who must have sorne persona] and manifestly ideologicaJ difficulties with these judgmen ts. As far as I am concerned, r would just like to state the following, so that no misunderstanding can accrue on this basis. My family, on the si de of my mother, co ming from Greece, escaped, at literally the last second, being killed by the Communists, in the civil war of 1946-49. ll is thus understandable that for this, but also for other reasons, I have hardly any sympa th y for the communists and in general for the far-left side of the political spectrum. It would therefore be difficult to tax me as an apologist for the Sanclinista regime in Nicaragua. However, I am incleed deeply committed to the international rule of law pitted against international anarchy and the power of the strongest in the best Darwinist vein. So much for background information.
The hanclling of the Nicaragua case by Professor Cheng is to be found on pp. r 4 r-62 of the book. 1 will proceed by quoting or summarizing the position of the au thor of the book, and then proceed to oppose my own arguments to those of Professor Cheng. I may be forgiven for speaking very openly and without al ways taking pains to honour diplomatie circumlocutions. There is no animosity in my argument, but I wish to make i t crystal clear.
r. The Nicaragua case 'illustratcs how deviating from legalism undermines the legitimacy of the international legal system and its effectiveness' (pp. 13 3, I4I ). This is a sort of general thread or tenet of the au thor, to be buttressed in the la ter detailed analysis of the judgment. Wc may take this argument as an interesting one, not so much because it shows what the Court has clone, but because it reflects something about the ideology of Professor Cheng. The Court is solid and legalistic in so many other cases; and then, at once, it jumps out of its general tenor, and suddenly becomes ideological and biased in one single case, and this happens to be the Nicaragua case,
where precise] y a facet of the most 'political' US foreign policy is condemned. The point is not so much that the US is condemned: thus, the US was also defeated in the Elettronica Sicula case in 1989, but that case was not bearing on heavily political matters. 2 In this latter context, the Court is th us not necessarily biased. In short, the Court is legalistic as long as it does not touch on basic political interests of the US. If it does, it has necessarily (obviously that part of the reality is beneath the level of conscience) fallen out of its usuallegalistic track. The US policy cannot be bad -a conclusion New Haven does not reach too infrequently, and it is not the single exception which Prof. Cheng mentions more than once in his book that will prove the rule.
Condemning a state for having, inter alia, mined the port of another state in times of peace is not 'ideological'; it flows from the law applicable. We have to put a si de our ideological preferences for state A or B. The Court righ tl y approaches the matter under the prism of the equality of states. Renee, if there were a wrong if state A committed certain acts against state B, there would also be a wrong if state B committed them against state A. I very much doubt that under such conditions the US and its people would have considered lawful the mining of its ports, with ali the concomitant danger for innocent persons. I wonder how Professor Cheng would have argued if Nicaragua had mined the port at New York, and the Court had condemned it for that. Would he have found that utterance a perfectly normal one? For any other state than the US and its allies, would he have accepted that the court acted 'legaliy' by censuring such behaviour; but not if the actor is the US? Or would the US people have considered lawful the publication and distribution of a brochure for psychological warfare to sorne insurgents within the US, which openly called for them to perform terrorist acts? The general policy of the US against terrorists does not le ad one to be lieve that. The Court has th us not been 'un-legalist' by condemning su ch action; it bas preciscly be en legalist: it applied the rules existi ng for ali the states according to the way the vast majority of them interpret these ru les. Il is perhaps difficult to understand that in the New Haven perspective, where everything turns on the individual decision maker. Can the position ofFrofessor Cheng th us perhaps be explained by his own blinded eye and bias? This partiality-soit appears tome -can easily be explained by the fa ct that he is not independent in judgement, as a citizen of (or a person espousing) the state condemned. You cannot be judge and party at once. There is as such nothing bad about being partial in such cases, because you defend 'your people'. The Court was not in this position. It was independent and impartial, in the sense that it did not have any national bias. Moreover, large majorities delivered its 1984 and 1986 judgments, including ali the Western judges with the exception of the US and UK ones. You may agree with the Court or not; but it is ali too easy to label something 2. The Provisional Measures Order was flawed. First, the Court ought to have addressed the arguments of the US that the present dispute was part of a large complex of interrelated political, social, economie, and security matters in the Central American Region. And the Court ought to have stated the reasons for deciding in fa v our of Nicaragua (on one point unanimously, on the other with only one dissent, by the US Judge). Article 56 of the Statu te states that judgments shall be motivated (arguably an Order is not a Judgment, but that is a too literai reading of Article 56) (p. 145--6).
None of these arguments possesses even the fain test and remotest justification. First, the Court does not address the merits in the provisional measures stage, which is an urgency procedure concerned only with the preservation of the object of the dispute (or the rights the claimant puts to fore) and the non-aggravation of the latter. The objcct of dispute of the provisional measures is th us distinct from the object in dispute on the merits. Nor is the Court at this carly stage in a position to express arguments on the merits, since it does not possess the necessary elements. The memorials and pleadings on the merit issues have not yet taken place. If the Court attempted to take a position on the merits, without possessing the proper information, that would indeed have to be brand cd an abuse of procedure. It has to be stressed that the jurisprudence of the Court bears testimony to su ch a handling of issues at the provisional measuresstage, and this sin ce the times of the PCIJ. The Court th us just followed, in this case, its age old line of case law. In this light, it is difficult indeed to label the present order non-legalist. In addition, the argument that the Court would have to express on the 'wider context' of the dispute seems particularly contrived, since the Court has always-rightly-rejected such arguments. Just a handful of years before the order in the Nicaragua case, the Court had rejected, on the merits stage, exactly the same argument made by Iran against the US in the 'Tehran Hostages case of r98o. 3 The Court is not divested of its competence on a certain issue sim ply because a legal dispute is part of a larger context; if it were so, the Court's jurisdiction could in almost every case be stymied, since the legal dispute brought to the Court is al ways part of a larger political context. In r 980, the US benefited from this rejection; l guess Professor Cheng would have found the Court very legalistic at that juncture. By the same token, this 'context' argument could have been rejected also in this order by a simple reference to the 1980 precedent and the consolidated case law of the Court. The Court, however, refrained from doing so, even if th at course would have been easy. lt refrained from taking that course in order to main tain its (legalistic) line of jurisprudence concerning the arguments that may, and those that may not, be considered at the provisional stage. The present argument indeed pertains to the merits; thus, the Court did not address it in the order on provisional measures. Finally, the reference to Article 56 is more than astonishing. The orders found that order insufficiently motivated but perhaps Iran had that feeling. Such an exposition of the law does not turn on objective application of rules; it is coloured by friend and foe, according toC. Schmitt the main cri teri on of 'political' thinking. 3· A slight criticism is voiced on the fact thal El Salvador was denied an oral hearing (written pieces had be en deposited) wh en a decision was ta ken on its motion to intervene (p. 147). Prof essor Cheng admits th at the motion of intervention did not possess a propcr abject in the jurisdictional phase, since it related to the merits stage (and could be presented again there). The criticism concentratcs on the absence of an oral hearing. The decision on that point was taken by a majority, and it can indeed be argued that an oral hearing should have been granted. However, the Court being in possession of ali the arguments, and the abject of the intervention being at that stage manifestly inadequate, an oral hcaring would have served no proper purpose on substance, a part from burdening and delaying the proceedings bctwecn the parties to the dispute (and the time schedule for the hearing of the parties, already settled, was tight). Moreover, such intervention, in view of its object, was fraught with the danger of impacting upon the merits. From the legal point of view, the question is to be looked at as follows.
6 Article 84, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court (1978) states, in this context: 'If, within the time-limit fixed under Art. 83 of thcse Ru les, an objection is fi led ... to the admissibility of a declaration of intervention, the Court shall hear the State seeking to intervene and the parties bef ore deciding'. The US did not abject; neither did Nicaragua abject, but drew the attention of the Court PCJJ, Series A, No. 8, at 6 ff. to certain deficiencies within the declaration of intervention. On a formai reading, since Nicaragua did not object to the declaration, El Salvador did not have a right to an oral hearing under Article 84, paragraph 2, of the Rules, but could respond in writing to the adverse comments by Nicaragua. However, there is a good argument that indeed Nicaragua has, in substance (if not in form), objected to El Salvador's daim, and that therefore a hearing should have been granted. Such a course would perhaps have been more in accordance with judicial propriety, as several judges noted. In sum, this criticism of Prof essor Cheng on this point may be warranted. The Court avoided that hearing essentially on account of the clear inadequacy of the declaration of intervention at the present phase of the jurisdictional proceedings, of its possession of ali the necessary elements to decide, and of the tight time limits in the principal case.lt is a matter of argument to what extent these justifications were sufficient for a somewhat formai interpretation of Nicaragua's reply to El Salvador's declaration on intervention. All in aH, it is often better to 'err' on the si de of excessive attention paid to procedural rights of the participants than to 'err' by denying su ch participation rights. 4· The Court could not uphold the compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, since Nicaragua had not been a party to the optional system at the PCJJ, and hence could not be one at the ICJ (p. 149). By holding to the contrary, the Court departed from legalism.
United States Diplomatie and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran),
The Court was faced with a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the PCI) under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. The history of that declaration was, to say the least, an unusual one. In 1935 the Senate of Nicaragua, and then the Chamber of Deputies, had approved the optional declaration proposed by their government: it had been formulated as early as 1929. A telegram had been sent by the Nicaraguan minister of foreign affairs to the League of Nations, notifying the League of Nicaragua's ratification of the declaration. The telegram stated that the instrument of ra ti Ji cation would be sent to Geneva, but in fa ct it never was received. It seems to have been sent by a seaborne courier during the Second World War, and was probably ]ost in transi V The question was whether the 1929 declaration, which unquestionably had not acquired full binding force, might nevertheless benefit, as an imperfected legal act, from the transfer from the PCI) to the ICJ under Article 36, paragraph s, of the Statu te. If it did, the simple deposit of a Nicaraguan instrument of ratification might perfect the r 9 29 Declaration and establish the Court's jurisdiction over the present case. 8 The essentiallegal question was thus whether Article 36, paragraph s, of the Statute presupposed an optional declaration that was formally perfected and in force, or whether an unperfected legal act could also benefit from the transference to the new Court and the re be completed by me ans of the neccssary formalities.ln sum, the question was not, as stated by Professor Cheng and by )udge )ennings, whether something non-existent at the PCI) could become something existent at the ICJ (which it could not). Itwasratherwhether animperfect declaration could be now completed by a legal act (ratification) to make it perfect, and, for this purpose, whether this provisionally imperfect legal act passed from the PCIJ to the ICJ. Nicaragua indeed needed the old imperfect act, since the deposit of a new optional declaration would have come after the denunciation of the declaration by the US, and therefore could not have triggered the jurisdiction of the Court ratione temporis.
The Court took the view that Article 36, paragraph 5 should be given a wide and teleological interpretation. The essential concern of those who drafted the Statute was to maintain the greatest possible continuity between the PCIJ and the ICJ. The point was to a void loss-of whatever nature-resulting from the transfer of judicial activity from the old Court to the new.9 The interpretation that was most consistent with this conception and with this objective was the one that preserved even the potential' 0 (or unperfected) effects of the 1929 declaration, i.e. its capacity to be subsequently perfected through the necessary formalities. This interpretation is certainly not self-evident; but it is absolutely congruent with the intention of the drafters of Article 36, paragraphs 5 and 37, of the Statu te, where the main pointis to 'a void any loss' by the passage from the PCIJ to the ICJ.'
1 This is not a departure from legalism, but a teleological interpretation of a provision of the Statu te. It was shared by a large majority of judges and corresponded to the intentions of the drafters of the Statute.
s. Judge jennings is right to say that the Court should not have applied the sixmonth notice for denunciation of the optional declaration by the US, since that would be unfair. It is unfair in regard to the states that have committed to no obligation under the optional system, when compared with the many who have not; and unfair because Nicaragua could withdraw at will from its own declaration, since it contained no six-month limitation (Jack of reciprocity). There is much 'to commend in the candor ofJudge Jennings' reasoning' (pp. rso-r).
Let us enter into this point with a general comment. The USA's optional declaration contained a stipulation entitling the USA to withdraw iton six months' notice. The optional declaration of the applicant, Nicaragua, contained no such clause. The USA sought to argue that, absent any restrictive wording, Nicaragua could withdraw its declaration with immediate effect. Consequently, by the operation of reciprocity, the USA claimed the benefit of the same right to withdraw its own declaration with immediate effect, so that the letter of Secretary of State G. Schultz, withdrawing the USA's optional declaration three days before Nicaragua brought the proceedings, should be considered decisive. This reasoning was defective in severa! ways. The flrst was that it confused a condition asto the duration of the oplional declaration 9 Nicaraguacasc,i\dmissibility and jurisdiction, supra nole r, al407--8.This interpretation is analyscd minutcly, with a material (subject matter) reservation. The second was that it presupposed that an optional declaration containing no provision asto the length of a notice of withdrawal could take effect immediately. The Court had no difficulty in showing that this was not the case, and that the rule as to a 'reasonable period of time' applied.' 2 Even applying reciprocity, the USA should consequently have allowed a reasonable time to clapse from the moment of withdrawal, and three days was obviously not long enough. Third, the USA's argument ran counter to the fact that reciprocity is applicable only from the moment the Court is seised, and between parties to a concrete case. There is no 'pre-seisin' reciprocity. At the preseisin stage reciprocity would, in any event, have to be multilateral and inchoate, and not an inter partes reciproci ty, which is the on ly ki nd admitted by the Statu te. Astate could pick and choose in a Il other optional declarations (with no link to the case to be brought to the Court) the conditions most favourable for it, in order to manipulate orto withdraw from its own declaration so asto stymie the jurisdiction of the Court. 'T'he compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ would th us become a parody, with no compulsory element at all. Fourth, the USA was projecting a 'reservation' into the Nicaraguan declaration (a reservation which was not actually there), and was claiming to rely on it against astate (Nicaragua) which had not accepted the Court's jurisdiction in tenns narrower th an its own. The Court stated, by way of reminder, that:
It appears de arly th at reciprocity cannat be invoked in arder to excuse departure from the terms of a State's own declaration, whatever its scope, limitations or conditions .... Reciprocity enables aState which has made the wider acceptance of the juriscliction of the Court to rely upon the reservations to the acceptance laid dawn by the other party. The re the effect of reciprocity ends'. 1 l ln the face of this situation, which legally is very clear indeed, it is difficult not to be grea tl y astonished -if I may use this lenient term --that three of the judgcs consideree! the USA's argument to be weil founded. ' 4
In sum, the arguments of Professor Cheng and rennings are in our eyes entirely flawed. First, it seems astonishing that under the flag of 'legalism' the Court is encouraged to simply ignore a black-letter condition for the denunciation of the optional declaration of the US. The US has freely chosen to insert this limitation; it should thus honour its own pledge. When a Court just ignores what is written down in black and white, it can easily be accused to manipulate and depart from lcgalism; but if it does the opposite, it is indeed a great deal harder to accuse it of the same misdeed. Second, there is absolutely no unfairness: the only unfairness is the attempt of the US to withdraw three da ys be fore the case was brought to the Court, by playing fast and loose with the optional-clause system. Wh y is there no unfairness? Let us look to the branches of the argument as presented above. The comparison of states within the optional system and states without is not only unwarranted, but r 2 Nicaragua case, Admissibility and jurisdiction, supra noter, at420, para. 63. also unheard of. It would be tantamount to comparing the situation of someone bound by a contract and another one not bound by a contract, saying that it is unfair to hold the first toits contractual obligations since the second is not bound by the same. According to the logic ofrudge )ennings, states thal are parties to the optional system would have to be allowed to do anything they wished, including disregarding engagements they had solemnly entered into, simply because other states, not parties to the system, are entirely free in relation to the Court and thus have more extensive 'rights' to do as they like, to submit or refuse to submit to the Court's jurisdiction by special agreement, and so on. This would seem to project reciprocity not just onto ali states parties to the system of the optional clause, but onto all the states of the world. This was an unprecedented proposai. I really wonder how it is possible to sell such arguments und er the flag of 'fairness'. Fin ally, the statement that the unfairness stems from the fact that Nicaragua could on its account withdraw at will and with immediate effect, whereas the US could not, is not only unwarranted, but frankly an utterly unfair argument. lndeed, the Court says exactly the opposite (as seen above ' 5 ): it affirms that Nicaragua could not, itself, denounce with immediate effect. Nicaragua could not rely on the fact that its declaration contains no time clause, since in the case of absence of any time clause in the declaration, the rule of a 'reasonable lime' applies, precise! y in order to main tain the usefulness of the optional-clause system. If any one could just denounce at will at any moment and with immediate effect, there would not be any compulsory jurisdiction any more. You are certainly not obliged to take part in the system; but if you do, you must commit to something and not reserve to yourself an attitude which defeats any usefulness of the system. In the eyes of the Court, the potential eviJ of denunciation with immediate effect was eliminated by a leve lling-up process:
neither Nicaragua nor the USA could wi thdraw its declaration wi th i mme dia te effect.
This interpretation is, from every point of view, sounder and more solidly based than an interpretation which allows withdrawals with immediate effect. However, even if one does not agree with this, it remains that according to the Court Nicaragua and the US were put on the sa me footing: neither could withdraw with immediate effect; the unfairness due to inequality disappeared. It is hard to understand why sorne au thors, such as Professor Cheng, just ignore this passage of the Court's reasoning and continue to criticize it on account of an argument silencing what the Court actually sa id. I am afraid, thus, that --in my eyes --there is hardly any candour in the interpretation propounded by )udge )ennings and by Professor Cheng, but rather, indeed, l have to frankly say it, a service to a preconceived cause. 6. On the merits, there are varions criticisms of departure from legalism. Some of them may be picked up here: (i) the Court gave a wrong interpretation when it stated that an armed attack in the sense of Article 5 r of the UN Charter do es not include the provision of weapons, or logistical and other support to an armed group (p. r 52); (ii) the Court did not take account of the facts, for ex ample the assist ance of the Sandinista government to rebel groups in other countries (pp. 153-4);
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hllp ://jou rna ls. cambridgc.org (iii) the Court found that 'the United States was responsible for the armed attacks of the contras because it exercised "effective control" over the contras' (p. r6o).
On point (i): the Court indeed uttered the current mainstream interpretation, backed by the vast majority of states. If the Court had given up this general opinion only in the present context, it could weil have been accused of a departure from 'legalism'. Moreover, the US, as a state that constantly and in many parts of the world supplies weapons to varied armed groups fighting for causes it favours, th us intervening in internai affairs, should be highly keen to maintain and hail the interpretation of the Court. If the other interpretation was chosen, i.e. the one favoured by Professor Cheng, more than a dozen states would have the right of self-defence (by using force) against the US. This includes military operations on its terri tory, the mining of its ports, bombarding, armed invasion, etc., limited only by the princip les of necessity and proportionality. Would the US public and Professor Cheng agree to such a result? I doubt it very much. If I am right, the interpretation of the Court is sound also in their eyes. The contrary position would then simply be self-interested, for the outcome of a particular situation in Central America. The law does not rest on such ad hoc interests, which turn as quickly as the wind.
Asto the issues of fact (point ii), it is necessary to stress that the Court proceedings are not based on an inquisitorial system (as in Continental criminallaw), but only on a private-law-type litigation system, where it is for the parties to bring to the Court the evidence they wish to rely upon (da mihifacta, dabo tibijus). 16 The Court thus do es not decide on material 'tru th', but on the sole basis of the evidence submitted to it. The Court will add to the evidence submitted by the parties only notorious facts, and possibly (but rarely) expert knowledge it seeks from Court-appointed experts. This not only stems from the fact that the procedure takes place between sovereign states placed on a footing of equality (adversarial proceedings). It also stems from the fact that only tl1e Jitigating states possess the relevant information. The Court has no proper means, neither logistically nor financially, to conduct its own inquiries. In the present case, if the Court was not in possession of ali the information the US deemed to be essential, the fault falls on itself, since it decided, after the jurisdictional phase, not to appear any more at the Court. This is an option, which was open toit. But it is un fair to complain after the fact of the consequences to be ascribed only to its own delibera te choice. On the contrary, the US should then assume in full these consequences, legal and other, of ils debatable course of conduct, which, as already stated, was at once possible and open toit.
As to point (iii), the Court says exactly the opposite of what Professor Cheng affirms. Moreover, the restrictive cri teri on of 'effective control' (which he criticizes) operated complctely to the bene fit of the US, and this was so since the Court held to the contrary of wh at he erroneously states. If the re ader is not convinced by my barc and barren statemcnt, I shall quo te from the Court:
The Court do es not consider that the assistance givcn by the United States to the contras warrants the conclusion that thcsc forces arc subjcct to the United States to such an In the dispositif, or operative part, one does not find any single point dealing with any attribution of the Contras acts to the US. I do therefore not know how exactly to take Professor Cheng's point. Either it stems from a lack of having re ad carefully and in full the judgment; this would be problematic for a lawyer and a commenta tor. Or, alternatively, it stems from a voluntary miscarriage of the facts in order to be able to further cri ti cize the judgment, which would be open dishonesty. 1 cannat believe that the latter is truc. Conversely, the comments ofProfessor Cheng on the problems triggered by the strict adherence of the ICJ to a reading of Article 51 of the Charter, which supposes the existence of an armed attack by astate, are not considered he re.
There are good arguments in this context on both sides, that of the Court and that of its cri tics. Hence this is a point oflaw on which reasonable men, as the Anglo Saxons put it, may reasonably differ. Concluding, it must be said that Professor Cheng's book remains absolutely stimula ting reading, especially since it is coloured in a certain way and departs from European mainstream positions. I felt obliged to forcefully defend the Nicaragua judgments, on which I feel as strongly as Professor Cheng, but in the exact opposite way he cloes. For me, the Court has proven in these cases to be the guarclian of internationallegality, whether there is a strong or a weak state in front of it. Any of the acts for which the US has been conclemned in that case would probably have been acceptecl as a sound exposition of the law if they hacl concernecl other states than the US, or simply if they hacl concerned a state labellecl A, placed behind the famous veil of ignorance. The who le worlcl (but the US) hasse en in these judgments a proof of the indepenclence and the courage of the ICJ.' 8 The juclgments may not have been carriecl out, as Professor Cheng notices, but that is not all too grave. The responsibility for not having honoured its commitments when ratifying the UN Charter rests on the US; the Court, for its part, has clone its cluty and this will remain on the record. It has not bowed to arrogance and to power. The contrary concluct woulcl have been by far more self-destructive to the Court. It woulcl have given the image of a subservient and over-cautious (if nol frightened) body, not living up to its responsibilities as soon as a great power asserts itself with insistence in a given case. Once more: lam not concerned with R. Reagan and his policies; nor would I be with those of any other, for example Brezhnev and his policies, or th ose of my country, Switzerland, or th ose on es of my motber's country, Greece, or tho se of my father's country, Austria, orthose of China. The general rules of international law 1 7 Nicaragua case, Merits, supra nole r, al 65, para. 116, italics ad dccl.
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Th at a court of justice shows truc indcpcndence and courage especially wh en il goes into cases conccrning the powerful and does nol confine itself to the judging of the sm aller subjccts is a tri te but general tru th. journalists oftcn stress thal, e.g. reccntly a gain for the Brazilian Supreme Court in the Mcnsalao corruption scandai, wh cre the journalist (of a modera tc right-wingSwiss ncwspapcr)writes: 'Das Obcrstc Gericht hat Mut und Unabhiingigkcit bewicsen und eindrücklich dcmonstricrt, dass das Gcsctz für alle gill' ['The Supreme Court has shawn courage and inclcpendcnce; il impressively demonstratcd thatlhe law is applicable to all'];
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 Dcccmber 2012, no. 296, 21 . This is the way the Nicaragua juclgmcnt on the mcrils was perceived by a large part of the world.
have to remain the same for ali states. For me, in a litigation, there are only states A and states B. That is the reason Iso often moved the argument of reciprocity, asking rhetorically wh at would have been the position of the US and Professor Cheng if the rule proposed as being sounder by this author had been applied reciprocally against the US. ln sum, the Nicaragua judgments remain somewhat bold (but not at ali excessive) on the jurisdictional plane and to a significant degree sound on the merits. That this is viewed somewhat differently by sorne US citizens (or by those living there) may be understood.
